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Theory and previous evidences provide conflicting predictions concerning the 
growth effects of foreign direct investment (FDI). The mainstream ideas support 
FDI as an engine of employment, technological progress, productivity 
improvements, and ultimately economic growth. Because of these significant 
benefits, attracting FDI has become one of the integral parts of economic 
development strategies in many countries. There are two schools of thought that 
hypothesize the FDI determinants: economic factors and political factors. For the 
latter school of thought, the central questions are directed to determine whether 
political regime affect country’s trade policy or not. In the advanced industrial 
countries where labour tends to be scarce, are left political regimes more 
protectionist than right ones, which represent capital owners? Prior evidence had 
demonstrated an association between the type of political regimes and trade 
policies (FDI policies). 
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This paper extends the cross-country and temporal variance in national policies 
of FDI. The theory looks at government partisanship, which we define in terms of 
left parties or right parties and contesting with global competitiveness index, 
which reflects the economics factors’ school of thought. The paper tests two 
hypotheses that explore various aspects how the parties in Euro Area and 
Southeast Asian countries have competed over trade policy. This study uses Euro 
Area countries and Southeast Asian countries that actively do outward and 
inward FDI. The time frame of analysis is 2000-2006 period that is believed as a 
start of Economic Integration in the European Union, which is symbolized with 
the launching of European Single Currency at that time. Statistic methods used 
for testing the hypothesis are t-test and multivariate regression model. 
 
The empirical results provide support for an intuitively positive effect of 
globalization that makes left parties and right parties converge on its political 
economy and preference into open or free trade, which is the main component of 
global competitiveness index. After controlling for various factors, political 
regime does not matter. In terms of position taking, both types of political regimes 
consistently take the free trade stances. In other words, it can be believed that 
Euro Area and Southeast Asian governments’ preference on political economic 
and foreign investment are becoming more symmetric over time. 
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Since trade policy has significant effects that are predictable and observable, 
politicians are likely to be concerned about trade policy in their efforts to win 
elections. If so, parties should develop positions on trade policy that reflect their 
constituents’ interests. As they do on other issues, parties should thus adopt 
positions on policy that reflect their overall ideological or partisan position in 
policy space. Studies of macroeconomic policy (both fiscal and monetary) have 
shown that such party differentiation occurs. Left-wing parties prefer policies that 
increase government spending and induce growth, while right ones favor policies 
that induce lower spending, more balanced budgets, and lower inflation.  
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These facts trigger an interesting question to investigate whether there is a 
noticeable difference among political parties in a country on their trade positions, 
especially, which are related to their policies on foreign trade in terms of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Furthermore, this study asks whether this difference 
relates to some left-right ideological distinction among parties. Do left-parties 
advocate different trade policies or FDI policies than right-parties? In other words, 
can we use parties’ positions on a generic left-right partisanship scale to predict 
their trade policy preferences?     
 
Many theories about parties and trade policy respond negatively, predicting 
instead the convergence of parties’ positions. In their investigation on 25 
developed countries from 1945 - 1998, Milner and Judkins (2002) find that right-
wing parties announce trade positions that favor free trade, meanwhile left-wing 
parties are more protectionist. Partisanship seems to have an important effect on 
trade policy, holding other factors constant. Pinto and Pinto (2006) find evidence 
of the existence of such partisan cycle of direct investment performance across 
countries and over time at the industrial level. Foreign investors seem to respond 
to partisan cycles: when parties of opposite ideologies alternate in power, FDI 
flows into those sectors where foreign capital is a component of the factor of 
production owned by the core constituent of the incumbent party, and out of those 
sectors where it substitutes for the factor owned by that constituent. 
 
The research’s main problem will be to analyze whether political parties compete 
over trade policy, especially the policy that is related to foreign direct investment 
in certain area. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to explore the concepts 
of partisanship and trade policy and their effects on foreign direct investment both 
in home countries (Euro Area countries) and in host countries (Southeast Asian 
countries). The study will be looking at the effects of political party type on 
foreign direct investment whether in home country or in host country at the time 
of certain political party type governs a country. In particular, this research tests a 
multivariate regression model of the relations between the orientation type 
political parties and foreign direct investment on a cross-sectional sample of 248 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Partisanship  
  
A completely new field of economics opened up once Hibbs (1977) presents a 
model in which parties also behave “ideologically”. Winning elections is 
important, but only to the degree that it enables the party to “implement policies 
favoring their core constituencies”. This contrasting theory is called the Partisan 
Theory. It is argued that political parties, as organizers of broad coalitions of 
interests and ideas, have played a key role in the economic policy-making process. 
There is also wide agreement in the literature that governments controlled by 
conservative or social democratic parties have distinct partisan economic 
objectives that they would prefer to pursue in the absence of any external 
constraints. Socialist governments are expected to intervene extensively in the 
economy to modify market outcomes and redistributive wealth to favor the least 
advantaged sectors and advance equality in general. Conservative parties are 
generally assumed to develop less interventionist policies and to rely on market 
mechanisms to maximize economic growth and protect individual liberties. 
 
According to the assumptions of the partisan model, which provide the initial 
foundation of this study, political parties adopt different economic strategies due 
to the latter’s redistributive effects of different combinations of unemployment 
and inflation lead left-wing and right-wing cabinets to choose different 
macroeconomic policies. In short, economic strategies respond to the concerns of 
the particular electoral constituencies that support the party in power. It 
emphasizes the fact that, besides responding to voter’s preferences, economic 
policies are employed to build electoral coalitions. According to Boix (1998), 
governments eventually have to choose between two alternative economic 
strategies to spur economic growth and sustain the competitiveness of domestic 
firms in the medium run. In one case, governments employ the public sector to 
raise the level of domestic savings and total investment and boost the productivity 
of capital and labor. In the other case, they rely on market mechanisms and private 
agents to maximize the rate of investment and thus foster economic growth. 
 
2.2. Partisanship and Foreign Direct Investment 
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In context of the relationship between FDI and trade policy, theoretical arguments 
have made the two complement or substitute each other. Earlier theoretical efforts, 
like Mundell (1957), highlight the trade-substituting nature of FDI, and many 
recent efforts tend to favor FDI being trade complementing. As Petri (1995) and 
Pfaffermayr (1996) argue, however, the relationship is not predictable because the 
trade impact of FDI can be influenced by a range of factors, such as firm 
strategies, motivations for FDI, and government policies. Therefore, the 
relationship between FDI and trade policy remains a subject requiring empirical 
investigation.  
 
According to Pinto (2005), FDI policies of OECD countries can be explained by 
looking at the left-right orientation of the government in power. A party‘s position 
on a unidimensional left-right ideological scale will have an important, 
predictable impact on its trade policy position.  In developed countries, left parties 
should take positions more favorable to protection, and right ones should be more 
free trade-oriented. 
 
What generates a party’s preferred-policy position, especially on trade? Parties 
tend to locate themselves in terms of domestic political debates along some 
unidimensional left-right ideological spectrum in order to attract voters who 
harbor similar positions. A party‘s general ideological position arises from its 
historical position on a number of cleavages in society. For most OECD countries, 
a central cleavage around which they formed was class. Parties representing the 
working class fought their way into the system and into government in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries.  These left-wing parties typically reflected the class-
based preferences of their core constituents, workers. In addition, as Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) argued years ago, these old class cleavages persist in the party 
systems of today. Despite vast social, political, and economic changes, the party 
systems of the 1990s looked similar to those of the 1940s. Parties have been able 
to keep large bodies of citizens identifying with them over a long period of time 
and to renew their core clienteles from generation to generation.   
 
The assumption that governments have partisan (and electoral) incentives in 
regulating economic activity is pervasive in the literature that explores the links 
between politics and macro-economic management: Hibbs (1977, 1992) and Tufte 
(1978) are the precursors in this tradition. Political parties build and nurture ties to 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE STUDIES 
Vol 3, No  1, 2011   ISSN:  1309-8055 (Online) 
 
 40
groups of voters, whether organized or not, and when in government tend to 
deliver policies valued by those groups for material (or ideological) reasons. 
 
3. DATA, MODEL SPECIFICATION, AND RESULTS 
 
The countries studied in this research are Euro Area countries, such as Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Southeast Asian countries, such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Although other Southeast 
Asian countries (and other emerging countries outside Asia) are also the recipients 
of FDI inflows from Euro Area countries, the five Southeast Asian countries 
considered here as the most stable democratic countries in that area. 
 
The research carries out a multivariate regression to assess the relationship 
between government partisanship and FDI policies. The dependent variable is the 
FDI, and is defined as the natural logarithm of the annual FDI outflows and 
inflows of each country. Many studies have used FDI in measuring trade policy 
(Pinto, 2005; Pinto and Pinto, 2006). Milner and Judkins (2002) argue that FDI is 
a common and rational choice in investigating the effect of partisanship on trade 
policies, due to its characteristics that are strong tied to the government political 
economy. The natural log transformation of FDI is used to mitigate possible 
problems with the sample distribution of the amount of FDI. 
 
Six sets of explanatory variables are included in an attempt to capture different 
effects. The first explanatory variable is the government partisanship variable. 
Since a country’s FDI flow is likely to be affected by many factors other than the 
government partisanship, the remaining five sets of variables are included in an 
attempt to control for these other effects. These variables are used to “isolate” the 
effects of the partisanship on trade policy. 
 
The first hypothesis proposes that left parties in Euro Area countries will prefer to 
apply trade policies that are favorable to protectionism (no-inward FDI). This first 
model is tested by regressing the dependent variable, ln FDI outward against the 
home government partisanship (Euro Area countries) and control variables. To 
test for the hypothesized relationship between government partisanship and FDI 
policies in Southeast Asian countries (host countries), the Euro Area countries’ 
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partisanship variable is augmented to the regression model. This second model is 
intended to test the second hypothesis that proposes left parties in Southeast Asian 
countries are likely to have trade policy that is more favorable protectionism, 
while right parties are likely to have trade policy that is more supportive of inward 
FDI. 
 
Correlation analysis (Table 1) shows that some explanatory variables are 
significantly correlated. First, there is significant positive correlation between the 
EAPT (Euro Area Partisanship) and Openness variables (0.308), even though the 
correlation is quite small. This may be quite surprising since left wing 
governments normally are expected to be more favorable to protectionism or have 
negative relation with FDI outward policies. However, Garrett (1998) 
demonstrates that when left-wing parties control governments and labor market 
institutions are strongly institutionalized, they are associated with big traders. 
 
Table 1: Coefficient Correlation of Hypothesis 1 
Independent 
Variable EAPT 
GDPEA OPENEA EMPLOYEA POPULEA UNEMPLOYEA GCIEA 
EAPT 1.000 .138* .308** -.077 -.155* -.048 -.081 
GDPEA .138* 1.000 .663** -.623** -.140* .090 -.285** 
OPENEA .308** .663** 1.000 -.203** -.296** .022 .031 
EMPLOYEA -.077 -.623** -.203 1.000 .250** -.104 .389** 
POPULEA -.155* -.140* -.296** .250** 1.000 .040 -.421** 
UNEMPLOYEA -.048 .090 .022 -.104 .040 1.000 .017 
GCIEA -.081 -.285** .031 .389** -.421** .017 1.000 
 
     Note: *p < 1%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 10% 
 
The GDP and Openness variables are also positively correlated significantly 
(0.663). This statistic confirms the Euro Area countries’ productivity, which 
suggests that the large portion of its GDP comes from its international trade 
activities. Romer (1989) posits the positive relationship between openness and 
economic growth as a stylized fact. On the other hand, in this investigation 
provides an interesting phenomenon that is contrary with common assumptions. 
Normally, it is said that bigger countries have more openness in its trade than 
small countries. A significant negative correlation between Openness and 
Population that represents country size (-0.296) support this phenomena. This 
implies that the small countries in Euro Area are able to optimize its productivity 
by having more international trade activities than the big ones. 
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Table 2 presents the regression results for the Euro Area countries’ partisanship 
test (that is, Model I). As can be seen from this table, there is an interesting 
evidence of a positive relation between government partisanship and FDI outflow. 
The coefficient on the EAPT variable is positive, even though is not statistically 
significant (t = 0.988). 
 
Table 2: The Effect of Euro Area’s Partisanship on FDI Policies (Model I) 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
Constant -3.917* -3.020 
EAPT .181 .988 
GDPEA .603* 2.696 
OPENEA 1.392* 3.658 
EMPLOYEA 2.257 .819 
POPULEA .321 1.547 
UNEMPLOYEA -7.951** -2.573 
GCIEA .373** 2.278 
MODEL 
F – value   = 6.608* 
R – square = 0.162 
 
              Note: *p < 1%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 10% 
 
This positive relation is different from the previous studies that suggest that left 
parties are favorable to protectionism. It seems that partisanship in the Euro Area 
countries does not have any effect to its trade policy or FDI policy. The GDP 
variable which proxies for country growth has a positive and significant 
coefficient (t-statistic = 2.696). This consistent with the investigation results of 
Grosse (1997) and Jensen (2006) that demonstrate countries with higher per capita 
GDP are expected to promote future MNC involvement, as growth is more 
sustainable. It also represents the wealth of a country or the ability to invest 
abroad. The positive and significant coefficient of Openness on FDI confirms the 
Euro Area countries’ productivity, which suggests that the large portion of its FDI 
comes from its international trade activities, and it is supported by national 
competitiveness (global competitive index), which is correlated positively and 






INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE STUDIES 
Vol 3, No  1, 2011   ISSN:  1309-8055 (Online) 
 
 43
Table 3: Coefficient Correlation of Hypothesis 2 
Independent 
Variable EAPT SAPT GDPSA OPENSA EMPLOYSA POPULSA UNEMPLOYSA GCISA 
EAPT 1.000 .134* .019 .103 .002 .232** .208** .035 
SAPT .134* 1.000 .092 .071 -.034 .141* .218** 0.58 
GDPSA .019 .092 1.000 .108 .157* .152* -.164** -.072 
OPENSA .103 .071 .108 1.000 .059 .127* -.082 .143* 
EMPLOYSA .002 -.034 .157* .059 1.000 .276** -.152* -.043 
POPULSA .232** .141* .152* .127* .276** 1.000 .622** -.073 
UNEMPLOYSA .208** .218** -.164** -.082 -.152* .622** 1.000 -.216** 
GCISA .035 .058 -.072 .143* -.043 -.073 -.216** 1.000  
Note: *p < 1%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 10% 
 
The next stage of analysis involves testing the relationship as developed in the 
second hypothesis. It reveals that the coefficient on EAPT is negative but 
insignificant. The coefficient on SAPT is positive and significant. 
 
Table 4: The Effect of Southeast Asian’s Partisanship on FDI Policies (Model II) 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic 
Constant -.844 -1.037 
EAPT -.038 -.223 
SAPT 1.029* 3.766 
GDPEA .591** 2.025 
OPENEA -.107 -.500 
EMPLOYEA -2.247 -.602 
POPULEA .085 .477 
UNEMPLOYEA 12.821** 2.289 
GCIEA .172** 2.102 
MODEL 
F – value   = 7.491* 
R – square = 0.201 
 
          Note: *p < 1%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 10% 
 
This positive relation between partisanship in Southeast Asian countries and FDI 
policies is different from the previous studies that suggest that left-wing parties 
are favorable to protectionism. It seems that whatever ruling parties governing in 
Southeast Asian countries, those parties have a strong preference to attract foreign 
investment to accelerate the economic growth. In other words, these countries put 
economic growth goal above political preferences. 
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When analyzing the partisanship type of ruling parties that govern in Euro Area 
and its impact on trade policies, it can be concluded that government partisanship 
does not influence its FDI outflows into Southeast Asian countries. In other 
words, whether left-wing parties or right ones, both types support FDI outward 
and there is no any different preferences in define its political economy. 
Meanwhile, Southeast Asian governments’ preference on political economic and 
FDI are becoming more symmetric over time (and the literature has shown that 
this is also true with respect to macroeconomic variables; the business cycles in 
the original ASEAN countries are becoming increasingly correlated). It does not 
matter what kind of party will take a rule, the government will always be more 
favorable to free trade or inward FDI. 
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